그레그 "러시아가 천안함 보고서 발표하면 MB 큰 타격"
<NYT> 기고문에서 '믿을만한 러시아 친구' 말 전언
도널드 그레그 전 주한 미국 대사가 러시아가 천안함 보고서를 공개하지 않는 이유와 관련, 자신의 '믿을 만한 러시아 친구'가 “러시아의 조사 결과가 이명박 대통령에게 큰 정치적 타격을 주고 버락 오바마 대통령을 당황하게 만들 수 있기 때문”이라고 말했다고 밝혀 파문이 일고 있다.
그레그 전 대사는 31일(현지시간) <뉴욕타임스>에 기고한 ‘북한의 반응 살피기(Testing North Korean Waters)’라는 제목의 글을 통해 지난 6월 한국을 방문해 천안함 관련 증거물을 조사한 러시아 정부가 조사 결과를 왜 공개하지 않느냐고 믿을 만한 러시아 친구에게 물은 결과, 이같은 답을 들었다고 전했다.
그는 또 “5월26일 한국의 천안함이 서해에서 발생한 불가사의한 상황에서 폭발해 침몰했다”며 “천안함과 관련해 추가 대북제재 등 한국과 미국의 강경책이 이어지고 있지만, 문제는 천안함 침몰이 북한의 소행이라는 한국의 주장에 모든 국제사회 성원들이 동의하는 것은 아니다”라며 한국 정부 조사결과에 강한 의문을 제기하기도 했다.
그는 한국의 고위 외교관을 인용해 “이명박 정부는 북한으로 통하는 모든 다리를 불태워버렸다. 그리고 출구전략 없는 강경책을 밀어붙이고 있다. 현재의 남북관계는 전통적인 치킨게임을 닮아가고 있다”며 두 전임 대통령과 달리 강공 일변도인 이명박 정부의 대북정책을 비판하기도 했다.
그는 또 대북 봉쇄에 따른 한-미 양국의 김정일 정권 붕괴 기대를 일축하며 “평양에 대한 최근의 가중되는 압력은 북한의 중국에 대한 의존성을 강화시킬 것”이라며, 최근 김정일 북한 국방위원장의 방중을 그 증거로 꼽기도 했다.
그레그 전 대사는 1989~1993년에 주한 미대사를 지냈고 현재는 '코리아소사이어티' 회장을 맡고 있는 미국의 대표적 한반도 전문가여서, <뉴욕타임스> 및 <뉴욕타임스> 국제판인 <인터내셔널헤럴드트리뷴>을 통해 전세계에 보도된 그의 글은 향후 적잖은 국내외 파장을 불러올 전망이다. 특히 그의 글은 이명박 대통령이 오는 9월 러시아 방문을 앞두고 나온 것이어서, 청와대의 반응이 주목된다.
다음은 그레그 전 대사의 기고문 가운데 러시아의 천안함 보고서 관련 발언 전문.
Testing North Korean Waters
By DONALD P. GREGG
Still, a year ago, it seemed possible that relations between Seoul and Pyongyang might improve. A North Korean delegation to the August 2009 funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung, champion of the “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea, was warmly received by President Lee. Later in 2009, North Korea proposed a North-South summit meeting and also invited Kim Dae-jung’s widow to visit Pyongyang.
But while these conciliatory gestures by North Korea were still under consideration, on March 26 the South Korean Navy frigate Cheonan exploded and sank under mysterious circumstances in the Yellow Sea just off the coast of the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korean naval vessels have often clashed.
A South Korean investigation concluded that the ship was sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. The United States concurred, and the sinking of the Cheonan came to be viewed in the United States as proof of North Korean infamy.
The United States imposed additional sanctions on the North and joined South Korea in staging military exercises of an unprecedented scope on sea and land.
One of South Korea’s leading diplomats put it to me this way: “The Lee government has burned all its bridges with North Korea, and has been undertaking hard-line policies with no exit strategy. The current North-South relationship resembles a classic game of chicken.”
One problem, however, is that not everybody agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied responsibility, and both China and Russia opposed a U.N. Security Council resolution laying blame on North Korea.
In June, Russia sent a team of naval experts to look over the evidence upon which the South Korea based its accusations. Though the Russian report has not been made public, detailed reports in South Korean newspapers said the Russians concluded that the ship’s sinking was more likely due to a mine than to a torpedo. They also concluded that the ship had run aground prior to the explosion and apparently had become entangled in a fishnet, which could have dredged up a mine that then blew the ship up.
South Korea has not officially referred to the Russian conclusions. When I asked a well-placed Russian friend why the report has not been made public, he replied, “Because it would do much political damage to President Lee Myung-bak and would embarrass President Obama.”
Recent statements by senior U.S. officials in Washington have continued to blame the Kims for the sinking of the Cheonan; it was purportedly done to prove the toughness of the ruling family as it prepares for another transition.
But whatever the impact of military maneuvers, economic sanctions and verbal attacks might be, those in Washington and Seoul who are hoping for a collapse of the Kim regime are doomed to disappointment. China will not let that happen.
China might not be happy with a nuclear-armed North Korea, but it is far more worried by instability on the Korean Peninsula.
Putting further pressure on Pyongyang also only strengthens its dependence on China. The increasing frequency of Kim Jong-il’s trips to China, and the quality of the reception he receives, are clear indications of this trend.
American pressures are also likely to instill a mistrust and hostility toward the United States in the mind of Kim Jong-un, who is in his mid-20s and about whom little is known.
The disputed interpretations of the sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to reverse course and to get on track toward dealing effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Details of the South Korean investigation of the Cheonan tragedy have not been made public, and undercurrents of opposition to its conclusions are growing stronger in Seoul.
그레그 전 대사는 31일(현지시간) <뉴욕타임스>에 기고한 ‘북한의 반응 살피기(Testing North Korean Waters)’라는 제목의 글을 통해 지난 6월 한국을 방문해 천안함 관련 증거물을 조사한 러시아 정부가 조사 결과를 왜 공개하지 않느냐고 믿을 만한 러시아 친구에게 물은 결과, 이같은 답을 들었다고 전했다.
그는 또 “5월26일 한국의 천안함이 서해에서 발생한 불가사의한 상황에서 폭발해 침몰했다”며 “천안함과 관련해 추가 대북제재 등 한국과 미국의 강경책이 이어지고 있지만, 문제는 천안함 침몰이 북한의 소행이라는 한국의 주장에 모든 국제사회 성원들이 동의하는 것은 아니다”라며 한국 정부 조사결과에 강한 의문을 제기하기도 했다.
그는 한국의 고위 외교관을 인용해 “이명박 정부는 북한으로 통하는 모든 다리를 불태워버렸다. 그리고 출구전략 없는 강경책을 밀어붙이고 있다. 현재의 남북관계는 전통적인 치킨게임을 닮아가고 있다”며 두 전임 대통령과 달리 강공 일변도인 이명박 정부의 대북정책을 비판하기도 했다.
그는 또 대북 봉쇄에 따른 한-미 양국의 김정일 정권 붕괴 기대를 일축하며 “평양에 대한 최근의 가중되는 압력은 북한의 중국에 대한 의존성을 강화시킬 것”이라며, 최근 김정일 북한 국방위원장의 방중을 그 증거로 꼽기도 했다.
그레그 전 대사는 1989~1993년에 주한 미대사를 지냈고 현재는 '코리아소사이어티' 회장을 맡고 있는 미국의 대표적 한반도 전문가여서, <뉴욕타임스> 및 <뉴욕타임스> 국제판인 <인터내셔널헤럴드트리뷴>을 통해 전세계에 보도된 그의 글은 향후 적잖은 국내외 파장을 불러올 전망이다. 특히 그의 글은 이명박 대통령이 오는 9월 러시아 방문을 앞두고 나온 것이어서, 청와대의 반응이 주목된다.
다음은 그레그 전 대사의 기고문 가운데 러시아의 천안함 보고서 관련 발언 전문.
Testing North Korean Waters
By DONALD P. GREGG
Still, a year ago, it seemed possible that relations between Seoul and Pyongyang might improve. A North Korean delegation to the August 2009 funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung, champion of the “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea, was warmly received by President Lee. Later in 2009, North Korea proposed a North-South summit meeting and also invited Kim Dae-jung’s widow to visit Pyongyang.
But while these conciliatory gestures by North Korea were still under consideration, on March 26 the South Korean Navy frigate Cheonan exploded and sank under mysterious circumstances in the Yellow Sea just off the coast of the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korean naval vessels have often clashed.
A South Korean investigation concluded that the ship was sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. The United States concurred, and the sinking of the Cheonan came to be viewed in the United States as proof of North Korean infamy.
The United States imposed additional sanctions on the North and joined South Korea in staging military exercises of an unprecedented scope on sea and land.
One of South Korea’s leading diplomats put it to me this way: “The Lee government has burned all its bridges with North Korea, and has been undertaking hard-line policies with no exit strategy. The current North-South relationship resembles a classic game of chicken.”
One problem, however, is that not everybody agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied responsibility, and both China and Russia opposed a U.N. Security Council resolution laying blame on North Korea.
In June, Russia sent a team of naval experts to look over the evidence upon which the South Korea based its accusations. Though the Russian report has not been made public, detailed reports in South Korean newspapers said the Russians concluded that the ship’s sinking was more likely due to a mine than to a torpedo. They also concluded that the ship had run aground prior to the explosion and apparently had become entangled in a fishnet, which could have dredged up a mine that then blew the ship up.
South Korea has not officially referred to the Russian conclusions. When I asked a well-placed Russian friend why the report has not been made public, he replied, “Because it would do much political damage to President Lee Myung-bak and would embarrass President Obama.”
Recent statements by senior U.S. officials in Washington have continued to blame the Kims for the sinking of the Cheonan; it was purportedly done to prove the toughness of the ruling family as it prepares for another transition.
But whatever the impact of military maneuvers, economic sanctions and verbal attacks might be, those in Washington and Seoul who are hoping for a collapse of the Kim regime are doomed to disappointment. China will not let that happen.
China might not be happy with a nuclear-armed North Korea, but it is far more worried by instability on the Korean Peninsula.
Putting further pressure on Pyongyang also only strengthens its dependence on China. The increasing frequency of Kim Jong-il’s trips to China, and the quality of the reception he receives, are clear indications of this trend.
American pressures are also likely to instill a mistrust and hostility toward the United States in the mind of Kim Jong-un, who is in his mid-20s and about whom little is known.
The disputed interpretations of the sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to reverse course and to get on track toward dealing effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Details of the South Korean investigation of the Cheonan tragedy have not been made public, and undercurrents of opposition to its conclusions are growing stronger in Seoul.
<저작권자ⓒ뷰스앤뉴스. 무단전재-재배포금지>
